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datory national vote, scheduled for 22 April 2020, was 
postponed due to the corona virus pandemic.
In general, the constitutional reform relies on the 
procedure established by Article 136 of the Constitu-
tion. According to this procedure the amendments could 
already be in force. However, the new amendment law 
introduced two additional procedural preconditions: 
approval by the Constitutional Court and a national 
vote. The amendments will come into force on the day 
of the publication of the results of the national vote if 
more than half of the voters participating voted in favor 
of the amendments.
Therefore, at the moment, it is hard to predict how 
and when the constitutional amendment process will 
be completed.
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ANALYSIS
The Institutionalization of Personalism?  
The Presidency and the President after Putin’s Constitutional Overhaul
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Abstract
Is it still possible to conceive of the institution of the presidency being separate from Vladimir Putin, the 
president? The constitutional amendment that would zero out Putin’s current presidential terms and there-
fore allow him to run once more for president in 2024 suggest that regime personalization has further prog-
ressed. Nonetheless, it still remains analytically useful and important to distinguish between the presidency 
and the president: presidential power remains a polymorphous phenomenon. Putin needs to maintain con-
trol of a strong presidency to exert authority.
One-Man Rule?
Vladimir Putin seems to have merged with the Rus-
sian presidency. He even admitted this himself in his 
speech to the State Duma plenary session on 10 March 
2020: “I am convinced that a time will come when the 
supreme power in Russia, that of the President, will no 
longer be personified and will no longer be associated 
with a specific person.”1 However, he left open the ques-
tion of when that time will come. In Putin’s view, Rus-
sia still has to go through a long, evolutionary develop-
ment, for which a strong presidential hierarchy of power 
is absolutely indispensable.
When on 15 January Vladimir Putin unveiled his 
plans for the most comprehensive overhaul of Rus-
sia’s constitution since its adoption in 1993, it initially 
appeared to many observers that he intended to remain 
in power beyond 2024 by stepping down from the presi-
dency, and by occupying another high-ranking position 
in the state and thereby retaining power as the de facto 
ruler. This theory was suspicious from the very begin-
ning2 for two reasons: First, contrary to Putin’s rhe-
toric, the draft amendments submitted to the Duma on 
20 January strengthened the presidency at the cost of 
other state organs. Second, as a consequence, no other 
position in the state was bolstered to such a degree that 
would allow Putin to wield enough power to check 
a future successor president. Take Kazakhstan for com-
parison: The formal upgrade of Russia’s State Council 
is negligible compared to the sweeping powers Nazar-
baev prescribed to the chairman of Kazakhstan’s Secu-
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rity Council3, the position he took up later after stepping 
down from the presidency while retaining far-ranging 
prerogatives as the first president of Kazakhstan-Elbasy4.
The 10 March “Tereshkova amendment” during the 
second Duma reading was the first clear and unambig-
uous signal that the constitutional overhaul was about 
Putin’s “end game”5: The “zeroing out” of Putin’s pres-
idential terms would allow Russia’s long-term ruler to 
run for the presidency once more in 2024. At this point, 
however, it remains unknown when the constitutional 
amendments will come into force6. The plebiscite ini-
tially slated for 22 April was postponed indefinitely due 
to the Covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, uncertainty will 
remain up until 2024 whether Putin will run again for 
the presidency. Nonetheless, the formal zeroing out of 
presidential terms marks a further increase in person-
alization of Russia’s authoritarian regime. Given this 
high degree of personalism7, one might ask whether it is 
possible to conceive of the institution of the presidency 
being separate from Putin, the president? What system 
of power has Putin built over the past 20 years? And 
finally, how much does Putin control in Russia today?
Does Putin Decide Everything Himself?
In comparative presidentialism, it is common to distin-
guish between president-centered and presidency-cen-
tered explanations of presidential behavior.8 In author-
itarian regimes with a high degree of personalization 
such as Russia, one might indeed ask whether a presi-
dency-centered approach is still justified. But as I argue 
in a forthcoming article9 on the Russian Presidential 
Administration, presidential power can be conceptual-
ized as a polymorphous phenomenon: Depending on the 
level of analysis such as time or policy domain, presiden-
tial behavior can follow highly personalized or, to the 
3 Adilet.zan.kz (2020) ‘O nekotorykh voprosakh Soveta Bezopasnosti Respubliki Kazakhstana‘, 12 February. Accessed 30 March 2020.
4 Adilet.zan.kz (2017) ‘O pervom Prezidente Respubliki Kazakhstan-Elbasy’, 15 June. Accessed 30 March 2020.
5 Hale, H. (2020) ‘Putin’s end game?’ Ponars Policy Memo 638. Accessed 30 March 2020.
6 There is convincing evidence that both the content and procedure of the constitutional amendments are unconstitutional: Rogov, K. (2020) 
‘Dekonstruktsiya Konstitutsii’. Moscow: Fond ‘Liberal’naya Missiya. Accessed 30 March 2020.
7 Personalism is understood as a regime trait rather than a regime type. For a time-variant concept of personalism see: Geddes, B., Wright, J. 
G., Wright, J., and Frantz, E. (2018) ‘How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse’. Cambridge University Press.
8 Hager, G. L., and Sullivan, T. (1994) ‘President-centered and presidency-centered explanations of presidential public activity”. American 
Journal of Political Science, p. 1079–1103.
9 Burkhardt, F. (2020) ‘Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia’s Presidential Administration’, Europe-
Asia Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1749566 (forthcoming).
10 Sakwa, R. (2010). ‘The dual state in Russia’. Post-Soviet Affairs 26(3), p. 185–206. The concept of the dual state goes back to Ernst Fraen-
kel: Fraenkel, E. (1941). ‘The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11 Shevtsova, L. (2007) ‘Russia lost in transition: the Yeltsin and Putin legacies’. Carnegie Endowment.
12 Baturo, A., & Elkink, J. A. (2016) ‘Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014’. Post-Soviet 
Affairs, 32(1), p. 75–98.
13 Gorlizki, Y. (2002) ‘Ordinary Stalinism: the Council of Ministers and the Soviet neopatrimonial state, 1946–1953’. The Journal of Modern 
History, 74(4), p. 699–736.
14 Petrov, N. (2011) ‘The nomenklatura and the elite’, in: Petrov, N. and M. Lipman (eds.) ‘Russia in 2020: Scenarios for the Future’. Brook-
ings Institution Press, p. 499–530.
15 Ledeneva, A. V. (2013) ‘Can Russia modernise? Sistema, power networks and informal governance’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
contrary, institutionalized patterns. A related conception 
is the “double state” in Russia.10 In this state, there are 
two different regimes whose interaction creates constant 
tension and uncertainty. One regime is that of the pres-
ident’s “manual control,” in which his personal author-
ity is paramount. The second regime is governed by reg-
ular and rule-based patterns of behavior, for example in 
the everyday management of the civil bureaucracy, in 
which even the strong president cannot easily interfere.
Yeltsin was already called an “electoral monarch”11 
because of his personalistic style. However, personal-
ization has steadily increased under Putin.12 A grow-
ing number of policies that were once part of the sec-
ond regime are no longer protected from attacks by the 
first regime. Of course, this rules-based, institution-
alized behavior should not be confused with “democ-
racy” or “good governance”: even under Stalinism such 
a second regime existed to a certain extent.13 To illus-
trate that presidential power is still a polymorphous phe-
nomenon, in the following sections I attempt to disen-
tangle president- and presidency-centered characteristics 
of Putin’s Russia.
Putin as the Mafia Boss of a Network State?
To describe the Putin system, one can imagine a kind 
of solar system in which various actors from the politi-
cal and economic elite orbit the Putin sun. The celestial 
bodies are of different weights, are closer to the sun or 
further away from it, and can also have their own satel-
lites. Other metaphors can also be used: a politburo in 
which there are different categories of members accord-
ing to the Soviet model. Or several Kremlin towers that 
face each other in contention.14 One of the most elab-
orate models is that of sistema:15 a network state in which 
the elite bends or bypasses laws. The network state cre-
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ates interdependencies in the extremely complex net-
work of relationships among this elite.
However, it would be too simplistic to reduce the 
sistema to a kleptocracy, a mafia state, or a militocracy 
under the sole rule of the siloviki, the leaders of Russia’s 
military and intelligence agencies. Informal practices 
remain ambiguous,16 moving smoothly between legal-
ity and illegality, legitimacy and illegitimacy. For exam-
ple, someone in the presidential administration can pick 
up the phone to influence the courts (telephone justice). 
On the other hand, governors sometimes make calls to 
overcome bureaucratic hurdles in building factories, or 
to call back aggressive regulators from successful com-
panies. The new prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, 
for example, succeeded in modernizing the tax author-
ity. He is considered a comparatively effective manager 
in the civil service, who in 2020 received the second 
most important post in the country. At the same time, 
he amassed a significant fortune with the help of his 
family members, according to Alexey Navalny’s Anti-
Corruption Foundation.
How Popular is Putin?
The Kremlin likes to measure Putin’s popularity in polls, 
and there is good reason for that. The presidential rat-
ing is one of the most important resources available to 
Putin. His consistently high approval ratings have hov-
ered between 60 and almost 90 percent over the past 
20 years, symbolizing the leader’s direct engagement 
with the people. To maintain the “image of invincibility” 
and the sense that there is no alternative, the Kremlin 
must ensure that Putin is the most popular politician in 
Russia permanently and by far. As constant plebiscites 
of approval,17 ratings and polls are intended to replace 
other broken feedback channel to the population, such 
16 Ledeneva, A. (2016) ‘The ambivalence of favour’ in: Henig, D. and Makovicky, N. (eds.) Economies of Favour after Socialism. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, p. 21–49.
17 Yudin, G. (2019) ‘Governing Through Polls: Politics of Representation and Presidential Support in Putin’s Russia’ Javnost – The Public, 
p. 1–15.
18 Reuter, O. J., and Robertson, G. B. (2012) ‘Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Russian gubernatorial appoint-
ments’ The Journal of Politics, 74(4), p. 1023–1037 // Ukaz Preyidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 25.04.2019 no. 193 ‘Ob otsenke effektivnosti 
deiatelnosti vysschich dolzhnostnych lits (rukovoditelei vysschich ispolnitelnych organov gossudarstvennoi vlasti) subektov Rossiskoi Fed-
eratsii i deiatelnosti organov ispolnitelnoi vlasti subektov Rossiskoi Federatsii’. Accessed 30 March 2020.
19 Treisman, D. (2011) ‘Presidential popularity in a hybrid regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin’. American Journal of Political Science, 55(3), 
p. 590–609.
20 Barbashin, A., Irisova, O., Burkhardt, F., and E. Wyciszkiewicz (2017) ‘A successful failure: Russia after Crime(a)’. Warsaw: Center for Cen-
tre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding. Accessed 30 March 2020.
21 Frye, T. (2019) ‘Economic sanctions and public opinion: Survey experiments from Russia’. Comparative Political Studies, 52(7), p. 967–
994 // Hale, H. E. (2018) ‘How Crimea Pays: Media, Rallying ‘Round the Flag, and Authoritarian Support’. Comparative Politics, 50(3), 
p. 369–391.
22 Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2015) ‘How modern dictators survive: An informational theory of the new authoritarianism’ National Bureau 
of Economic Research.
23 Frye, T., Gehlbach, S., Marquardt, K. L., & Reuter, O. J. (2017) ‘Is Putin’s popularity real?’ Post-Soviet Affairs, 33(1), p. 1–15.
24 Volkov, D. (2020). Is Putin no longer Russia’s Mr. Popular? Riddle Russia. Accessed 30 March 2020.
25 Greene, S., & Robertson, G. (2017) ‘Agreeable authoritarians: personality and politics in contemporary Russia’ Comparative Political Studies, 
50(13), p. 1802–1834.
as elections or the media. Even for governors in the 
regions, they are considered one of the most important 
indicators that determine their careers.18
But what makes Putin popular, and to what extent 
is this popularity real? In particular, the fluctuations in 
confidence and approval ratings show that it is not so 
much Putin’s biography and personal traits that con-
tribute to his popularity, but above all two aspects: the 
perception of economic development and the expecta-
tion that one’s own economic situation will improve, 
and, in the foreign policy sphere, the sense of an exter-
nal danger.
Large fluctuations after unpopular social or pen-
sion reforms or longer-term downward trends after the 
Great Recession reflect changing perceptions among 
the population.19 Russian foreign policy sometimes 
causes erratic changes: especially in conflict situations 
in which Russia is threatened, or to the contrary, when 
foreign policy “successes,”20 such as the annexation of 
Crimea, trigger euphoria, there are rally-‘round-the-
flag effects that at least temporarily increase support 
for Putin.21
However, media control and Internet censorship play 
a crucial role. One simulation assumes that a repeal of 
Internet censorship would cause Putin’s rating to plum-
met by 35 percentage points.22 The question of whether 
Putin’s popularity is genuine is therefore not clear. In any 
case, research shows that respondents do not lie when 
asked about Putin.23 The restriction of political competi-
tion, censorship of television and Internet control cre-
ate an alternative reality, which suggests majority sup-
port for the president.24 Since most Russians are above 
all apolitical, the minority, which is willing to answer 
questions from pollsters, often joins the perceived major-
ity for social reasons.25
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 250, 9 April 2020 8
And this majority is undergoing a significant trans-
formation. Especially in the last two years, the appetite 
of the Russian population for change has grown con-
siderably. By the end of 2019, a clear majority of 59% 
thinks decisive, comprehensive changes are needed.26 
Recent polls on constitutional amendments suggests 
that an unambiguous pro-Putin majority is absent. Rus-
sia’s population is split in half: While 48% of Levada 
respondents approve of the “zeroing amendment” nul-
lifying Putin’s presidential terms and allowing him to 
run again in 2024, 47% disapprove.27 Younger and more 
urban Russians are more likely to oppose Putin run-
ning again for president. Moreover, the Covid-19 pan-
demic did not lead to a rally-‘round-the-flag in the face 
of a dangerous disease. Putin’s somewhat erratic reaction 
to the Coronavirus in conjunction with a historic drop 
in the oil price led to a sharp decline in Putin’s appro-
val ratings. Given that those who oppose a violation of 
term limits are more likely to protest28, and that mass 
mobilization is a major threat29 for personalist author-
itarian regimes, it is fair to assume that uncertainty30 
is to remain the main characteristic of Russia’s regime 
transformation.
Organization Chart of Power: The 
Continued Significance of Formal 
Institutions
In the network state, not only personal, but also pre-
dominantly formal, competences play a prominent role. 
Constitutions can be conceived of as “power maps” that 
signal to the individual actors of the elite who is the 
most powerful patron of the network. Because of his 
position as head of state, Putin is the linchpin of this 
patronal presidentialism.31 He is at the forefront of var-
ious pyramid-shaped networks and thus acts as a ref-
eree in the struggle for power and resources in the state 
and the economy.
Vladimir Putin inherited from Boris Yeltsin a 1993 
constitution in which the presidency was endowed with 
enormous powers, especially by international standards. 
The powers are distributed among different state bodies, 
but the president is hardly ensnared by checks and bal-
ances. He hovers over the other branches of govern-
26 Kolesnikov, A. and D. Volkov (2020) ‘Russians’ growing appetite for change’. Carnegie Moscow Center. Accessed 30 March 2020.
27 Levada-Center (2020) ‘Obnulenie prezidentskikh srokov’, 27 March. Accessed 30 March 2020.
28 Chaisty, P. and S. Whitefield (2019) ‘The political implications of popular support for presidential term limits in Russia’. Post-Soviet Affairs, 
35(4), p. 323–337.
29 Grundholm, A. T. (2020) ‘Taking it personal? Investigating regime personalization as an autocratic survival strategy’. Democratization, 
p. 1–19.
30 Noble, B., and N. Petrov (2020) ‘Russia’s uncertain regime transformation,’ Chatham House. Accessed 30 March 2020.
31 Hale, H. E. (2014) ‘Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective’. Cambridge University Press.
32 Stykow, P. (2019) ‘The devil in the details: constitutional regime types in post-Soviet Eurasia. Post-Soviet Affairs’, 35(2), p. 122–139.
33 Burkhardt, F. (2017) ‘The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise 
of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012’. Post-Soviet Affairs, 33(6), p. 472–495.
34 Wilson, A. (2005) ‘Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world’. Yale University Press.
ment and has the final say, especially with regard to 
Parliament.32
Although the Constitution remained virtually 
untouched until 2020 with a few exceptions, the presi-
dent’s powers have been steadily expanded beyond the 
constitution since 1993 via changes in federal (con-
stitutional) laws, presidential decrees and decisions of 
the Constitutional Court. The result is an institution-
alized asymmetry of power in which the president and 
the executive branch play a much greater role than any 
other branch.33 In terms of the separation of powers, 
Putin’s constitutional overhaul therefore achieved two 
goals: First, it sends a clear signal that the presidency 
will remain by far the most powerful organ in the state. 
Tereshkova’s “zeroing amendment” was needed precisely 
because the initial constitutional amendment draft from 
January diluted the signal of who would be the main 
patron after the reform. The threat of Putin being per-
ceived as a “lame duck” loomed large. Second, chapters 
3 to 8 of the constitution are amended in a way that to 
a large degree adapt the constitutional text to constitu-
tional reality in which the presidency already had powers 
such as the general leadership over the cabinet, the dual 
executive divided in a presidential and a prime ministe-
rial bloc in the cabinet, the coordination of federal rela-
tions as chairman of the State Council, or control over 
local self-government, either informally or formally via 
gradual subconstitutional change.
All Just “Virtual Politics”?
While in the 2000s many observers argued that formally 
democratic institutions such as parties, parliament, or 
even elections in Russia under Putin were simply “vir-
tual politics” or made for propaganda, a new realization 
has emerged in recent years: political institutions func-
tion differently than in democracies, but they still per-
form important roles.34 With regard to the Presidential 
Administration (“the Kremlin”), we often tend to focus 
on salient personalities such as the chief of staff Anton 
Vaino, or the grey cardinals from the domestic politics 
department such as Vladislav Surkov or Sergei Kirienko. 
But as I show in my work, the reorganization of adminis-
trative units or recruitment patterns demonstrate a con-
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siderable institutionalization over time.35 Elections, to 
give another example, are not free and fair, since the 
campaigns are distorted and undemocratic. Yet elections 
are not meaningless: in the first place, they should co-
opt elites and opposition and provide information about 
how much popular support the regime has. Later, lop-
sided election results for Putin and United Russia are 
designed to send signals of strength and used to com-
mand the loyalty of regional bureaucrats.36 The same 
applies to the so-called “party of power,” the ruling 
party of United Russia: Despite its poor public image, 
the party guarantees the internal cohesion of the elites 
through its dominant position in the Federal Assembly, 
among governors, in regional parliaments and among 
mayors, and serves as a warning system to bring dis-
loyal behavior or counter-mobilization among the elite 
to light early on.37
However, excessive centralization can be costly. 
Already at the beginning of his first term, Putin pushed for 
harmonizing federal and regional legislation, strength-
ened control over regional security agencies by establish-
ing federal districts, abolished the 2004 gubernatorial 
elections, deprived the regions of significant tax revenues 
through a complicated redistribution system, and thus 
increased fiscal control.38 However, this centralization 
did not lead to better policy outcomes. Rather, it is one 
of the reasons for Russia’s bad governance.39 Governance 
problems, lack of feedback mechanisms and misincen-
tives for the regions prevent the socio-economic objec-
tives set in the May 2012 presidential decrees and the 
2018 national projects from being achieved. Although 
there are individual “pockets of efficiency”40 in federal 
and regional civil administration, the institutionalized 
power asymmetries lead to a paradox of power41: the 
omnipotent president, who can intervene in all policy 
areas through manual control, is also powerless when it 
comes to day-to-day management and long-term goals. 
In the face of a global health crisis such as Covid-19, for 
example, Putin can order to send Russian employees into 
paid holidays, but compliance by businesses is bound 
to be patchy. What he can’t order is to make Russia’s 
35 Burkhardt, F. (2020) ‘Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia’s Presidential Administration’, Europe-
Asia Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1749566 (forthcoming).
36 Zavadskaya, M., Grömping, M., and F.M. Coma (2017) ‘Electoral Sources of Authoritarian Resilience in Russia: Varieties of Electoral Mal-
practice, 2007–2016’. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, p. 25(4), p. 455–480.
37 Reuter, O. J. (2017) ‘The origins of dominant parties: Building authoritarian institutions in post-Soviet Russia’. Cambridge University Press.
38 Libman, A., and M. Rochlitz (2019) ‘Federalism in China and Russia’. Edward Elgar Publishing.
39 Gel'man, V., & Zavadskaya, M. (2020) ‘Explaining Bad Governance in Russia: Institutions and Incentives’. Ponars Policy Memo 634. 
Accessed 30 March 2020.
40 Gel’man, V. (2018) ‘Exceptions and rules: success stories and bad governance in Russia’. Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost, (6), p. 5–15.
41 Burkhardt, F. (2020) ‘Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia’s Presidential Administration’, Europe-
Asia Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1749566 (forthcoming).
42 Gessen, M. (2017) ‘The future is history: How totalitarianism reclaimed Russia’. Granta Books.
43 Laruelle, M (2018) ‘Is Russia Really “Fascist”? A Comment on Timothy Snyder’. Ponars Policy Memo 539. Accessed 30 March 2020.
44 Taylor, B. D. (2018) ‘The code of Putinism’. Oxford University Press.
crumbling health system fit for long-term health chal-
lenges beyond the pandemic.
Putinism as Ideology?
Especially after the annexation of Crimea, the debate 
about the role of ideology in Russia flared up again. For 
example, Masha Gessen42 saw Russia on the road to 
totalitarianism, and Timothy Snyder even diagnosed the 
dawn of fascism.43 Although some elements of totalitar-
ianism, such as ideologically driven state propaganda or 
high approval ratings for Putin, were present in the first 
period after the annexation as a sign of mass mobiliza-
tion, developments during the following years showed 
that Russian society is moving in exactly the opposite 
direction: the overly clumsy state television is becoming 
more unpopular, and especially after the 2018 pension 
increase, approval ratings also fell back to pre-2014 levels.
Not only did the population struggle to mobilize for 
Putinism, but in many places, local networks of activ-
ists have begun mobilizing against the regime because 
of declining real incomes, environmental problems, or 
election manipulation. That is why politics in post-
Soviet Russia is largely non-ideological. For most actors 
in the state, it can even be dangerous to position them-
selves ideologically. For ideological commitment would 
require a long-term planning horizon, which even the 
most important members of the elite have only lim-
ited access to.
This does not mean, however, that ideological fac-
tors are completely arbitrary or play no role at all. In 
an elaborate attempt to crack the code of Putinism, the 
American political scientist Brian Taylor reduces it to 
the following three elements: ideas, behaviors, and emo-
tions.44 Among the guiding ideas are a strong state and 
great power status, an anti-Western and anti-American 
stance, as well as conservatism and anti-liberalism. As 
behaviors, the “collective Putin" prefers control, order, 
unity and antipluralism, loyalty and hypermasculinity. 
Emotionally, respect and humiliation, resentment as well 
as vulnerability and fear are of great importance. Tay-
lor, however, warns against a too one-dimensional view 
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of this interpretation of Putinism: some elements were 
already present in Russia before Putin came to power. 
And, although these elements are shared by a significant 
part of the elite and wider society, factors such as gen-
erational change or the modernization of society from 
below contribute to Putin’s life constantly rewriting the 
already incoherent code of Putinism.45 What the con-
stitutional overhaul demonstrates is that constitutional 
amendments with regard to social and health policy as 
well as the “nationalization of elites” are very popular 
among the population. Nationalistic and conservative 
constitutional amendments, however, such as hetero-
sexual marriage, Russia’s thousand-year history, or the 
status of the Russian language are mainly driven by the 
elite which is much more conservative than the general 
population.
The Question of Power and the Medvedev 
Experiment
The question of whether Putin should be separated from 
the institution of the president poses challenges to Putin 
himself. To at least preserve the appearance of legality, 
he launched a kind of natural experiment between 2008 
and 2012. He left office because of the presidency’s two 
consecutive term limit. His successor, Dimitri Medve-
45 Panejach, E. (2018) ‘Otmiranie gosudarstva. Rossiiskoe obshshestvo mezhdu postmodernom i arkhaikoi, InLiberty. Accessed 30 March 2020.
dev, was elected president, and Putin formally held the 
second most important post in the Russian state as prime 
minister—but remained, de facto, the most important 
man in the state. This constellation is called rokirovka or 
castling and represents an almost ideal research design 
from a social science point of view.
The aim of the experiment was to find out whether it 
was enough to remain in power de facto. If Putin’s power 
were to be pinned solely to his person and networks, 
then, counterfactually, nothing should have changed 
in these four years, even if the prime minister has far 
fewer institutional levers than the president. It is not 
known whether Putin and Medvedev had agreed in 
advance, and to what extent their differing preferences 
in domestic and foreign policy in the tandem were just 
a show. The experiment, however, demonstrated—at 
least as Putin and the wider elite understood it—that it 
was not enough to remain in power de facto: in order to 
continue the Putin system in the long run, Putin also 
needed the formal and symbolic power of the strong 
presidency. In the spring of 2020, Putin has created all 
the preconditions for this. But the future of both the 
presidency and the president are as uncertain as never 
before in Russia’s post-Soviet history.
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